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Abstract
Adaptive behavior is mainly the result of adaptive brains. We go a step beyond
and claim that the brain does not only adapt to its surrounding reality but rather,
it builds itself up to constructs its own reality. That is, rather than just trying to
passively understand its environment, the brain is the architect of its own reality in
an active process where its internal models of the external world frame how its new
interactions with the environment are assimilated. These internal models represent
relevant predictive patterns of interaction all over the different brain structures: per-
ceptual, sensorimotor, motor, etc. The emergence of adaptive behavior arises from this
self-constructive nature of the brain, based on the following principles of organization:
self-experimental, self- growing, and self-repairing. Self-experimental, since to ensure
survival, the self-constructive brain (SCB) is an active machine capable of performing
experiments of its own interactions with the environment by mental simulation. Self-
growing, since it dynamically and incrementally constructs internal structures in order
to build a model of the world as it gathers statistics from its interactions with the
environment. Self-repairing, since to survive the SCB must also be robust and capable
of finding ways to repair parts of previously working structures and hence re-construct
a previous relevant pattern of activity.
Keywords: Predictive brain, Brain theory, Anticipatory systems, Schema-based learning, Cog-
nitive architecture, Structural learning, Autonomous agents, Animats
1 Introduction
This paper claims that the emergence of adaptive behavior arises from the self-constructive nature of
the brain. The brain builds itself up by reflecting on its particular interactions with the environment,
that is, it constructs its own interpretation of reality through the construction of representations of
relevant predictive patterns of interaction. Thus, in this paper we present the brain as the architect
of its own reality. In this regard, we formalize the constructive architecture of the brain within
the schema-based learning framework. We introduce the predictive (forward internal models) and
its associated dual schemas as active processes capturing relevant patterns of interaction; and
we suggest that the brain is composed of myriads of these patterns. These predictive internal
models exist all over the brain and a variety of examples can be found in the literature regarding
different brain areas/functionalities, for instance: visual (Berkes, Orban, Lengyel & Fiser, 2011;
Corbacho, 1997; Rao & Ballard, 1999), sensorimotor (Corbacho & Arbib, 1995; Mehta & Schaal,
2002; Wolpert, Ghahramani & Jordan, 1995), and motor (Corbacho & Arbib, 1996; Corbacho,
Nishikawa, Weerasuriya, Liaw & Arbib, 2005b; Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Flanagan & Wing,
1997; Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Shadmer, Smith & Krakauer, 2010). Yet, these only represent the
”tip of the iceberg’, since they are all over all the different brain structures because they are the
result of a central principle of organization (Butz, 2008; Clark, 2013; Corbacho, 1997; Corbacho
& Arbib, 1997a,c; Downing, 2009; Grossberg, 2009; Haruno, Wolpert & Kawato, 2001; Hawkins,
2004; Hoffmann, Berner, Butz, Herbort, Kiesel, Kunde & Lenhard, 2007; Sigaud, Butz, Pezzulo
& Herbort, 2013; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). The existence of all these predictive internal models
in the brain can be observed through many anticipatory activity patterns as reported for instance
in (Bell, Han, Sugarawa & Grant, 1997; Droulesz & Berthoz, 1991; Duhamel, Colby & Goldberg,
1992; Munoz, Pellison & Guitton, 1991; Schutz & Prinz, 2007; Suri & Schultz, 2001; Szpunar,
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Watson & McDermott, 2007). We claim that this anticipatory activity patterns are emergent of
this type of constructive architecture, as it will be reported in this paper, showing anticipatory
responses in sensorimotor and motor maps. This constructive architecture is also required to be
able to construct and organize all these predictive patterns of interaction.
We propose that the brain is self-constructive (SCB) since it is self-experimental, self- growing,
and self-repairing. The brain is self-experimental since to ensure survival the self-constructive brain
is an active machine capable of performing experiments of its own interactions with the environment
as well as capable of mentally simulating the results of those interactions in order to be able to later
decide the most optimal course of action. In this regard, the way for our brain to fully understand
anything is to model and simulate it. To survive it must anticipate since anticipating an event
allows to better prepare for it, since it allows the animal/agent to get ready to act immediately
with the most successful course of action possible. Anticipation plays an important role in directing
intelligent behavior under a fundamental hypothesis that the brain constructs reality as much as
it embodies it. Hence, the anticipatory nature of the brain is a clear ingredient necessary for
the SCB. The brain is also self-growing, since it dynamically and incrementally constructs internal
structures in order to build a model of the world as it gathers statistics while maintaining its energy
consumption within bounds (Landauer principle). Finally, the brain is also self-repairing, since to
survive, it must also be robust and capable of self-organization and self-repair, that is, the brain is
capable of finding ways to repair parts of previously working structures and hence re-construct a
previous successful pattern of interaction.
These are evolutionary principles that have evolved in many different species, not just in mam-
mals. That is, these principles can be clearly observed at different levels of abstraction and simple
implementations can be found even in lower vertebrates. So, for instance, anurans brain capacity
for recovering a behavioral pattern of interaction after a critical lesion demonstrates their capacity
for self-repair. Self-experimental and self-growing, on the other hand, can also be tested by their
ability to learn certain problems such as learning to detour through the use of internal models. In
this regard, this paper provides evidence in anurans and provides its computational counterpart in
Rana Computatrix.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First we review the predictive brain, that is,
how the brain builds anticipatory responses to expected patterns of interaction. We review the
functionality of internal models as well as some experimental and computational data supporting
their existence all over the brain. Then, we introduce the Schema-based learning (SBL) constructive
architecture as one possible computational framework to formalize the constructive architecture of
the SCB. It allows the formalization and construction of internal models by predictive schemas
and their dual schemas, and through these computational models, is able to demonstrate how all
the experimental data on learning prey-catching, later presented in this paper, can be explained
following these previously mentioned SCB principles of organization.
In the next section, we introduce prey-catching as it is one of the most critical behaviors for sur-
vival since feeding is clearly necessary to maintain vital constants. We also study this behavior since
it is evolutionary critical for all species. It is also an adaptive behavior since, in a changing dynamic
environment, the conditions and contexts for prey-catching might change in unprecedented ways.
First, we review experimental data on learning to detour in section 3.1, and then in section 3.2 pro-
vide experimental data on learning prey-catching after a lesion. Both emergent adaptive behaviors
will prove to be excellent examples of the SCB principles of organization. Afterwords, we introduce
Rana Computatrix, the computational frog, as an experimental testbed in which we can test and
verify these same principles. In order to do so, we model the two behavioral/neuroethological cases
previously presented in prey-catching. Anurans, due to their simpler structure compared to mam-
mals, afford the construction of complete overall visuo-motor structures and behaviors. Also, Rana
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computatrix, a set of evolving models of adaptive visuomotor coordination constructed during years
of research, affords the design of new adaptive behaviors over the already previously constructed
models. Hence, a complete model can be laid down and hence overall behaviors can be analyzed
in detail.
The next three sections will serve to prove the self-experimental, self-growing and self-repairing
principles of the SCB by explaining behavioral data in anurans under the schema-based learning
constructive framework. The self-constructive brain is self-experimental since to ensure survival
the brain is an active machine capable of performing experiments of its own interactions with the
environment as well as capable of mentally simulating the results of those interactions in order to
be able to later decide the most optimal course of action. In order to understand its relation with
the environment, the brain constructs internal models of reality that allow the brain to internally
simulate its interactions with the environment. Hence, the brain has the capacity to design experi-
ments to be performed by interacting with the environment as well as experiments inside the mind,
for instance by mental practice/modeling, visualization and simulation. In this regard, cause-effect
experimentation (section 5.1) triggers the construction of predictive schemas and its dual schemas.
Hence, a very important component of the self-experimental brain consists on the ability to simulate
the causal flow of the interactions with the environment. In this regard, predictive schemas allow
for mental modeling. That is, they allow the system to anticipate the results of an action before
it is taken. That is, predictive schemas produce anticipatory representations of events/effects that
have no yet occurred in the external environment.
The self-constructive brain is self-growing. In this regard we show an example of schema
construction growing a new topological configuration to represent, and hence be able to reproduce,
a successful relevant pattern of interaction. We show how the brain builds itself up using the
SBL formalization of schema construction. We finish up by showing that the self-constructive
brain is self-repairing. Thar is, the brain has the capacity to repair itself and re-construct past
functionality after certain lesions may take place. In order to so, we show how the constructive
principles developed so far are able to explain learning after a lesion of the Hypoglossal nerve that
initially prevents mouth opening during prey catching.
2 The predictive brain: anticipatory construction of
reality
The brain is the architect of its own reality in an active process where its internal models of external
reality frame how its new interactions with the environment are assimilated. We claim that these
internal models represent relevant predictive patterns of interaction all over the different brain
structures: perceptual, sensorimotor, motor, etc. In order to survive, the brain must anticipate
since anticipating an event allows to better prepare for it, that is, it gets the animal/agent ready to
act immediately with the most successful course of action possible (Sutton & Barto 1981). Hence,
the anticipatory nature of the brain is a clear ingredient necessary for the SCB.
A key component of the predictive brain are internal models of the world, not only to understand
but to actually construct its own reality. They allow the agent to anticipate the results of its own
interactions with the environment and they play an important role in directing intelligent behavior
under a fundamental hypothesis that the brain constructs reality as much as it embodies it. Many
theories argue that the mind is for anticipation (Bar, 2007; Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010;
Butz, 2008; Clark, 2013; Corbacho & Arbib, 1997a; De Ridder, Verplaetse& Vanneste, 2013; Gilbert
& Wilson, 2007; Hawkins, 2004; Hoffmann, Berner, Butz, Herbort, Kiesel, Kunde & Lenhard, 2007;
Pezzulo, 2008; Pezzulo, Butz, Sigaud & Baldassarra, 2009; Rosen, 1985), or more precisely, for
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building and working upon anticipatory representations (Corbacho, 1997; Miceli & Castelfranchi,
2002; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). A real mental activity and representation begins to exist when
the organism is able to endogenously (not as the output of current perceptual stimuli) produce
an internal perceptual representation of the world -simulation of perception- (Castelfranchi, 2005).
Rather than passively waiting to be activated by sensations, it is proposed that the human brain is
continuously busy generating predictions that approximate the relevant future (Bar, 2007). That
is, the brain is proactive in that it regularly anticipates the future. Bar (2007) proposes that
rudimentary information is extracted rapidly from the input to derive analogies linking that input
with representations in memory. These predictions facilitate perception and cognition by pre-
sensitizing relevant representations.
Butz & Hoffman (2002) explain how to use the perceptual expectation for implicitly monitor-
ing the success of a rule-based reactive behavior, and as criteria for reinforcing or not a specific
rule. But it can also entertain a mental representation of the current world just for working on
it, modifying this representation for virtually exploring possible actions, events, simulations, and
so on. Intelligence is the capacity to solve a problem by working on an internal representation
of the problem, by acting upon images with simulated actions, or on mental models by mental
actions, transformations (reasoning), before performing the actions in the world. The ability that
characterizes a mind is that of building representations of the non-existent, of what is not currently
(yet) true, perceivable (Castelfranchi, 2005). A fully developed mind is able to build never-seen
scenes, new possible combinations of world elements never perceived. It is a process of building
and creation (by simulation) not just memory retrieval.
The ability to construct a hypothetical situation in one’s imagination prior to it actually oc-
curring may afford greater accuracy in predicting its eventual outcome. The recollection of past
experiences is also considered to be a re-constructive process with memories recreated from their
component parts (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Construction, therefore, plays a critical role in al-
lowing us to plan for the future and remember the past. Conceptually, construction can be broken
down into a number of constituent processes although little is known about their neural correlates
(Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Moreover, it has been suggested that some of these processes may
be shared by a number of other cognitive functions including spatial navigation and imagination.
Recently, novel paradigms have been developed that allow for the isolation and characterization of
these underlying processes and their associated neuroanatomy.
As already mentioned, the existence of all these predictive internal models in the brain can
be observed through many anticipatory activity patterns as reported for instance in (Bell et al.,
1997; Droulesz & Berthoz, 1991; Duhamel et al., 1992; Munoz et al., 1991; Schutz & Prinz, 2007;
Suri & Schultz, 2001; Szpunar, Watson & McDermott, 2007). There is, on the other hand, an
extensive literature on the use of mental models in cognitive architectures (e.g. Johnson-Laird,
1983). Miall and Wolpert (1996) suggested that the brain internally simulates the behavior of the
motor system in planning, control and learning. Such an internal forward model is a representation
of the motor system that uses the current sate of the motor system and motor command to predict
the next state. Miall and Wolpert (1996) outline the use of such internal models for solving several
fundamental computational problems in motor control and review the evidence for the existence
and use by the brain. In the next section we provide a brief review on the literature of internal
models in the brain.
2.1 Internal models in the brain
The importance of internal models in the brain has been acknowledged for many years (e.g. Craik
1943; Gregory, 1967; Arbib 1972). Internal models predict the evolution of the environment by
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imitating its causal flaw. They play an important role in directing intelligent behavior under
a fundamental hypothesis that the brain constructs reality as much as it embodies it. At the
behavioral level we see that animals learn to anticipate predictable events. The term internal
model is also popular in control theory and denotes a set of equations that describes the temporal
development of a real world process (e.g. Kalman 1960; Garcia et al. 1989).
The concept of an internal model, a system which mimics the behaviour of a natural process,
has emerged as an important theoretical concept in motor control (Jordan, 1983; Kawato, 1990,
1999; Kawato, Furukawa & Suzuki, 1987; Miall, 1993, 2003; Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert &
Flanagan, 2001; Wolpert, Miall & Kawato, 1998). Internal models can be classified into several
conceptually distinct classes. One type of internal model is a causal representation of the motor
apparatus, sometimes known as forward model (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992). Such a model would
aim to mimic or represent the normal behavior of the motor system in response to outgoing motor
commands. A forward model is a key ingredient in a system that uses motor outflow (also called
efference copy) to anticipate and cancel the sensory effects of movement. The internal sensory
signal needed to cancel reafference has been labeled corollary discharge.
Potential uses of forward models include: canceling sensory reafference, distal supervised learn-
ing, internal feedback to overcome time delays, state estimation, and state prediction for model
predictive control and mental practice/planning (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). More specifically, predic-
tive internal models may allow to transform errors between the desired and actual sensory outcome
for a movement into the corresponding error in motor command, to resolve ambiguous information,
to synthesize information from disparate sources, to combine efferent and afferent information, to
perform mental practice (internal simulation) to learn to select between possible actions, to per-
form state estimation in order to anticipate and cancel sensory effects of ones own actions (not
to distract attention/resources), to reduce the credit assignment space, to contribute to reasoning
and planning by forming predictive chains, and finally to estimate the outcome of an action and
use it before sensory feedback is available, when delays make feedback control too slow for rapid
movements (Miall & Wolpert, 1996).
One fundamental problem which the brain faces in the context of motor control is that the goal
and outcome of a movement are often defined in task-related coordinates (Jordan & Rumelhart,
1992). A basic problem, therefore, exists in translating these task-related (visual or auditory) goals
and errors into the appropriate intrinsic signals (motor commands and motor errors) which are
required to update the controller. The forward model can be used to estimate the motor errors
during performance by backpropagation of sensory errors through the model. In this paper we will
show how this problem of distal supervised learning generalizes beyond motor control and applies
to many schemas all over the SCB.
More recent models have paid closer attention to biological details/plausibility. These internal
models exist all over the brain and a variety of examples can be found in the literature regarding
different brain areas/functionalities, for instance: visual (Berkes et al., 2011; Corbacho, 1997; Rao
& Ballard, 1999), sensorimotor (Corbacho & Arbib, 1995; Mehta & Schaal, 2002; Wolpert et al.,
1995), and motor (Corbacho & Arbib, 1996; Corbacho, Nishikawa, Weerasuriya, Liaw & Arbib,
2005b; Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Flanagan & Wing, 1997; Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Shadmer,
Smith & Krakauer, 2010). Yet, these only represent the ”tip of the iceberg’, since they are all over
different brain structures because they are the result of a central principle of organization (Butz,
2008; Corbacho, 1997; Corbacho & Arbib, 1997a,c; Downing, 2009; Haruno, Wolpert & Kawato,
2001; Hawkins, 2004; Hoffmann, Berner, Butz, Herbort, Kiesel, Kunde & Lenhard, 2007; Wolpert
& Kawato, 1998). Anticipatory activity seems to reflect the processing of an internal model as
already discussed in the previous section. In the brain, anticipatory activity has been reported in
the hippocampus, anterior thalamus, frontal eye fields, superior colliculus, parietal cortex, striatum,
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and midbrain (see Corbacho, 1997; Downing, 2009 for reviews).
Another kind of internal models are known as inverse models (Atkeson, 1989), which invert the
causal flow of the motor system. They generate, from inputs about its state and state transitions,
an output representing the causal events that produced that state (Cruse & Steinkuelher, 1993;
Wada & Kawato, 1993; Shadmehr & Mussa-Ivaldi, 1994). For example, an inverse dynamics model
of the arm would estimate the motor command that caused a particular movement. The input
might therefore be the current and the desired state of the arm; the output would be the motor
command which would cause the arm to shift from the current state to the desired state. An inverse
sensory output model would predict the changes in state that corresponded to a change in sensory
inflow. In the kinematic domain the inverse kinematic model again inverts the forward kinematic
model to produce a set of joint angles which achieve a particular hand position. However, as a
forward model may have a many-to-one mapping, there is no guarantee that a unique inverse will
exist.
Historically, the notion of ”internal models of the world” led to the notion of schema (Arbib,
1972). Hence, we will use schema theory and particularly its extension schema-based learning
(Corbacho & Arbib, 1997c) as the framework to formalize the SCB.
3 Schema-based Learning constructive architecture
Schema theory and its extension with Schema-based learning (SBL from now on) might serve as a
possible framework to formalize the SCB. As we have already mentioned, historically the notion of
”internal models of the world” led to the notion of schema (Arbib, 1972). We first introduce and
formalize the notion of schema to describe the modular functional and structural characteristics of
the brain. Then we introduce the notion of predictive schema to generalize and formalize the concept
of internal forward models in the brain within the SBL architecture (Corbacho and Arbib 1997c;
Corbacho, 1998). The work presented here emphasizes the use and construction of new predictive
internal models (predictive schemas) as well as the construction of their corresponding dual schemas
when specific conditions arise during the interaction of the agent with its environment. SBL also
presents a more general approach including a wider variety of schemas, and a larger repertoire of
processes to construct the different kinds of schemas under various conditions.
Corbacho and Arbib (1997a) introduced the notion of coherence to emphasize the importance
of maximizing the congruence between the results of an interaction (external or internal) and the
expectations (previously learned) for that interaction. The fundamental two principles of organiza-
tion in SBL are coherence and performance maximization. Besides the main units of organization,
the predictive schema and its dual associated schema, goal schemas are the other component in
charge of dynamically setting a hierarchy of goals. SBL attempts to reduce incoherences and get
closer to goal states simultaneously. One of the main operations in SBL is the construction of all
these internal models.
We will briefly review the notion of schema introduced in Corbacho (1997). We described a
schema as a unit of concurrent processing corresponding to a domain of interaction. Lyons & Arbib
(1989) provided a formal semantics based on port automata and Corbacho (1997) extended this
definition to include schema activity variables and their dynamics. Other schema formalizations
related to developmental learning are possible (e.g. Drescher, 1991).
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Definition: A basic schema description is
basic-schema::= [Schema-Name: <N>
Input-Port-List: (<Iplist>)
Output-Port-List: (<Oplist>)
Variable-List: (<Varlist>)
Behavior: (<Behavior>)]
where N is an identifying name for the schema SN ,
< Iplist > and < Oplist > are lists of (Portname : Porttype) pairs for input and output ports,
respectively.
< V arlist > is a list of (V arname : V artype) pairs for all internal variable names, and
< Behavior > is a specification of computing behavior.
The notation ixk(t) is used to represent the pattern of activity in the kth input port of schema
Sx at time t and oxk(t) for the analogous output port. In the rest of the paper, in order to alleviate
the use of notation, when the schema has a single output port, then this output port takes the
name of the schema in lower case. That is, for instance we will use the notation prey(t) to name
the output port activity pattern from the SPREY prey recognition visual schema.
As we have already mentioned, Corbacho & Arbib (1997c) also introduced two special kinds of
schemas, namely predictive schemas and goal schemas. Goal schemas are a special kind of schemas
whose output port corresponds to a goal state (i.e. desired pattern of activation in another schema).
On the other hand, the role of the predictive schema is to anticipate the effect that the particular
pattern of activation of the cause schema has on the current state of the effect schema.
3.1 Predictive and Dual schemas
Corbacho (1997) presented predictive schemas as a generalization of forward models (Jordan &
Rumelhart, 1992) since they not only apply to motor control but rather to perceptual, sensorimotor
and abstract representational spaces as well. As already described, the role of the predictive schema
is to anticipate the effect that the particular pattern of activation of the cause schema has on the
current state of the effect schema. Also every predictive schema has an associated dual schema
that is responsible for selecting the optimal pattern of activity in the cause schema such that a goal
pattern of activity in the effect schema can be achieved.
Definition: A predictive schema P x,y associated with effect schema Sx and cause schema Sy is a
schema with the following special characteristics:
< Iplist >: The first input port is of the same type and connects to the output port of the
effect schema Sx, i.e. ix,y1 (t) = o
x(t). The second input port is of the same type and connects to
the output port of the cause schema Sy, i.e. ix,y2 (t) = o
y(t). The remaining input ports are optional
and correspond to context information; i. e. ix,y3 (t) = o
v(t)
< Oplist >: The output port contains the predictive response oˆx,y(t + 1), representing the
expectation for the state of the output port of the effect schema Sx at time t+ 1, i.e., ox(t+ 1).
< V arlist >: Includes the parameters of the predictive schema, namely Wx,yP (t).
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< Behavior >: The predictive schema behavioral specification includes a mapping Mx,yP pa-
rameterized by Wx,yP (t), such that
oˆx,y(t+ 1) = Mx,yP (o
x(t), oy(t), ov(t); Wx,yP (t)) (1)
as well as a mapping TP ,
Wx,yP (t+ 1) = TP (W
x,y
P (t), oˆ
x,y(t+ 1), ox(t+ 1)) (2)
TP allows the predictive schema to be tuned, i.e. its parameters change according to the prediction
error (ox(t + 1) − oˆx,y(t + 1)), so that the predictive response oˆx,y(t + 1) becomes increasingly
closer to the observed response ox(t + 1) as the number of interactions increases. In this regard,
several error minimization methods are valid. Also, depending on the architectural implementation
of the schema, Wx,yP takes the corresponding form. Corbacho et al. (2005) followed a particular
neural network implementation of both mappings Mx,yP (t) and TP (t) by a learning spatio-temporal
mapping algorithm. Sanchez-Montanes and Corbacho (2004) presented an information theoretic
metric to build this type of mappings.
Associated to the predictive schema P x,y there is always its corresponding dual schema Sy,x.
The predictive schema is the analogous to the forward internal models and the dual schema is the
analogous to the inverse internal model (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992).
Definition: A dual schema Sy,x associated with predictive schema P y,x, produces the necessary
optimal pattern of activity in cause schema Sy in order to successively achieve the desired goal
pattern of activity in the effect schema Sx. It is a schema with the following special characteristics:
< Iplist >: The first input port is of the same type and connects to the output port of the
effect schema Sx, i.e. iy,x1 (t) = o
x(t). The second input port is of the same type and connects to
the output port of the goal schema Gz,x, i.e. ix,y2 (t) = o
∗z,x(t + 1), that is, a goal schema that is
in charge of producing a goal pattern of activity for the effect schema Sx (defined below). The
remaining input ports are optional and correspond to context information; i. e. iy,x3 (t) = o
v(t)
< Oplist >: The output port is of the same type and connects to the input port of cause
schema Sy
< V arlist >: Includes the parameters of the dual schema, namely Wy,x.
< Behavior >: The dual schema behavioral specification includes a mapping My,x parameter-
ized by Wy,x(t), such that
oy,x(t) = My,x(ox(t), o∗z,x(t+ 1), ov(t); Wy,x(t)) (3)
as well as a mapping T ,
Wy,x(t+ 1) = T (Wy,x(t), ox(t+ 1), o∗z,x(t+ 1),
∂oˆx,y
∂oy
) (4)
T allows the dual schema to be tuned, i.e. its parameters change according to the performance
error (o∗z,x(t+ 1)− ox(t+ 1)), so that the observed response ox(t+ 1) becomes increasingly closer
to the desired goal response o∗z,x(t + 1) as the number of interactions increases. The problem
of training the dual schema is a distal learning problem (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992) since the
parameters of the dual schema must be adapted based on the error on a distal space. That is,
the dual schema must find parameters that recover the optimal patterns in the space of the cause
schema, that is in the representation space of oy(t) so as to reduce the difference in the distal error
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space (o∗z,x(t + 1) − ox(t + 1)). As Jordan and Rumelhart (1992) described, and online learning
algorithm based on stochastic gradient descend can be used. To perform adaptation, the change
of weights must take into account ∂o
x
∂oy . Yet, the dependence of o
x on oy is assumed to be unknown
a priori. Yet, given a differentiable predictive forward model, it can be approximated by ∂oˆ
x,y
∂oy .
That is, the distal error is propagated backward though the predictive schema (forward model) and
down into the dual schema (inverse model) where the weights are actually changed accordingly1.
Kawato’s (1990a) feedback-error-learning can also be used in this context. Later, Figure 5 will
schematize this information flow once a Rana Computatrix model is introduced and described.
3.2 Goal schemas and goal-oriented behavior
Goal oriented behavior is one of the hallmarks of intelligent systems. That is, the ability to set and
achieve a wide range of goals (desirable states defining an objective signal). Goal states must be
stored so that they can be actively sought for in the future. We must distinguish between implicit
(hardwired) goals and learned goals and subgoals. Drive reduction pertains to the first kind.
Where drives can be viewed as states (Milner, 1977), which influence neurons either mechanically
or chemically, and which have representations. Based on this hypothesis, Arbib & Lieblich (1977)
introduced a set (di, ...) of discrete drives to control the agent behavior. At each time t, each drive
di has a value di(t). Drives can be appetitive or aversive. Each appetitive drive spontaneously
increases with time towards dmax, while aversive drives are reduced towards 0, both according to
a factor αd. An additional increase occurs if an incentive I(d, x, t) is present such as the sight
or aroma of food (e.g. SPREY schema active) in the case of hunger. Drive reduction a(d, x, t)
takes place in the presence of some substrate -food reduces the hunger drive. If the agent is in the
situation x at time t, then the value of d at time t+ 1 will become
d(t+ 1) = d(t) + αd|dmax − d(t)| − a(d, x, t)|d(t)|+ I(d, x, t)|dmax − d(t)| (5)
Internal drives (variables) must be kept within a restricted interval to assure the survivability
of the agent (intrinsic/ hardwired goals). From this a hierarchy of subgoals has to be learned.
That is, what states take the system to the primary goals (Guazzelli, Corbacho, Bota & Arbib,
1998). Corbacho (1997) included hunger, fear, thirst, etc; in this paper we have included just
hunger. A goal corresponds to a state with a high drive reduction or in the way (anticipating drive
reduction). x in the definition above is the state of the output port of a schema (or schemas) at time
t. Corbacho (1997) described reinforcement type algorithms to store primary sensory goal states,
that is, sensory states associated with high reward or anticipation of reward. These are specially
needed in stochastic environments with delayed reinforcement (Sutton, 1988; 1990; Sutton & Barto,
1998), more details in Corbacho (1997).
Hence, the ability to set and generate goals and subgoals is critical, such as the goal state of
the jaw muscle spindles indicating that the mouth must be open in order to get the prey. So the
constructive brain architecture must be able to restore desired states so that they can be actively
pursued. The desired state in a particular schema is triggered by the contextual state defined by
the activity pattern in another schema. For secondary goals, goal states must be parametrized by
contextual information. That is, the goal pattern of activity must be produced by an adaptive
mapping. So, for instance, prey-catching reduces the hunger drive, which is signaled by the prey in
1For the sake of clarity and simplification for this article, we assume that only one predictive and its
corresponding dual schema are instantiated for each specific active motor schema. Hence, avoiding issues
of integration (linear on nonlinear). Thus, oˆx(t) = oˆx,y(t), oy(t) = oy,x(t) and ∂oˆ
x
∂oy =
∂oˆx,y
∂oy,x . In this regard,
equation 19 will also be simplified to reflect this assumption.
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the mouth, so that when a prey is within the visual field a subgoal must be generated so that the
jaw muscle spindles must get activated, indicating that the mouth is successefully open in order
to allow the prey to get into the mouth. During leaning, the reinforcement signals enhance the
elegibility of the projections from the prey recognition schema to the jaw spindles goal pattern
of activity representation (Corbacho, 1997). Another example in Rana Computatrix corresponds
to the goal schema that produces a goal pattern of representation in the motor heading map in
the presence of prey, namely representing that in order to capture the prey it must be centered
within its sensorimotor representation, that is the prey is ”within grasp”. Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2
will detail these goal schemas learned during learning to detour and learning to snap in Rana
Computatrix respectively.
Definition: A goal schema Gz,x associated to (source) schema Sz and (objective) schema Sx (typi-
cally an effect schema in a predictive schema) is a schema with the following special characteristics:
< Iplist >: The first input port is of the same type and connects to the output port of the
source schema Sz, i.e. iz,x1 (t) = o
z(t). The remaining input ports are optional and correspond to
contextual information.
< Oplist >: The output port contains the objective response o∗z,x(t + 1), representing the
desired pattern of activation in ox(t+ 1).
< V arlist >: Includes parameters of the goal schema, Wz,xG .
< Behavior >: Implements a mappingG from different inputs at different times to the objective
response,
o∗z,x(t+ 1) = M z,xG (o
z(t); Wz,xG (t)) (6)
as well as a mapping TG,
Wz,xG (t+ 1) = TG(W
z,x
G (t+ 1), o
∗z,x(t+ 1), ox(t+ 1)) (7)
corresponding to the parameter tuning. A specific spatio-temporal mapping learning algorithm to
learn this mapping is presented in (Corbacho et al., 2005b) and a generalized information-theoretic
measure is presented in (Sanchez-Montanes & Corbacho, 2004).
4 Adaptive prey-catching behavior in Anurans and Rana
Computatrix
Prey-catching is one of the most critical behaviors for survival since feeding is clearly necessary
to maintain the animal’s vital constants. We study this behavior since it is evolutionary critical
for all species. It is also an adaptive behavior since, in a changing dynamic environment, the
conditions and contexts for prey-catching might change in unprecedented ways. In this regard we
describe two adaptive patterns of interaction to catch prey, namely learning to detour around a
barrier to approach the prey and learning to snap the prey after the lesion of the Hypoglossal nerve
has occurred. Innate motor synergies allow the froglet to snap quite precisely to moving objects
(Weerasuriya and Licata 1996). Yet more precise and discriminative behaviors require learning from
the environment. That is the case when anurans learn not to snap to large objects by interacting
with preys of different sizes (Weerasuriya and Licata 1996). On the other hand, the animal might
also suffer different types of lessions during its lifetime and recovering its prey-catching capabilities
under different structural changes is obviously critical for its survival.
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This section briefly introduces experimental data on anurans and then, the later subsection,
describes models for these behaviors within the computational framework of Rana Computatrix.
As already expressed, Rana Computatrix consists of a set of evolving models of anuran adaptive
visuomotor coordination (Arbib, 1987). Corbacho and Arbib (1995) and Corbacho, Nishikawa,
Weerasuriya, Liaw and Arbib (2005a,b) emphasized adaptive prey-catching behavior in Rana com-
putatrix.
4.1 Learning to Detour: Experimental Data
Frogs have an innate ability to detour around narrow barriers (Collet, 1982). That is, when frogs
are presented with a barrier 10-cm wide made of a pailing fence, the frog is able to detour to catch
a worm on the other side of the fence (Figure 1A). A plausible explanation is due to the motor
heading map (mhm) integration hypothesis by which the prey produces an attractant field which
is is integrated with a repellent field produced by the obstacles (Corbacho & Arbib, 1995). For the
case of the narrow 10-cm. wide pailing fence the prey attractant field extends beyond the narrow
barrier repellent field, as it will be later explained. On the other hand, for wider barriers (i.e.
20-cm wide) frogs are uncapable of detouring around the fence and they actually go straight to
the position just in front of the prey and try to catch the prey by pushing the fence in repeated
occasions (Figure 1B).
———– FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ———–
Yet after several trials interacting with the wide barrier, the frogs learn to detour around the
barrier, so that when placed at the start position, after training, they immediately produce a series
of sidestep and forward moves that completely avoid the barrier as shown in Figure 1C (Corbacho
& Arbib, 1995).
4.2 Learning to Snap after Lesion: Experimental Data
Initially, following bilateral transections of the hypoglossal nerve, anurans lunge toward mealworms
with no accompanying tongue or jaw movement as displayed in Figure 2 (Weerasuriya 1989, 1991;
Anderson and Nishikawa 1993). This is so, since, before the lesion, the mouth opens thanks to the
delay produced by the hypoglossal nerve (HG) signal to the levator muscles (LM) with respect to
the depressor muscles (DM). Yet, following the lesion, they eventually learn to catch their prey by
learning to open their jaw again and lunging their body farther (Innocenti and Nishikawa 1994;
Gleason and Nishikawa 1996; Weerasuriya and Mills 1996). Innocenti and Nishikawa’s (1994) as
well as Gleason and Nishikawa (1996) studies on motor learning following hypoglossal transection
in toads show that the individual learning process is quite idiosyncratic. That is, each toad seems
to develop its own solution to the problem. The adaptation of the motor output may depend highly
on the particular features of the prey. Thus, the distinction between jaw prehension and tongue
prehension is only a qualitative analysis. Anurans use a visual analysis of prey features to modulate
many aspects of motor output. Kinematic variables that displayed a learning effect showed a
significant change during the motor learning period compared to the initial values (Innocenti and
Nishikawa 1994). Immediately following bilateral hypoglossal nerve transection, the percent of
successful mouth opening, prey contact, and prey capture made by toads decreased. Yet all this
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improved by interacting with prey (Innocenti and Nishikawa 1994; Gleason and Nishikawa 1996;
Weerasuriya and Mills 1996). Before surgery, capture success was nearly 100%. After surgery it fell
to 0%, and then returned to 100% within 5-6 weeks. Innocenti and Nishikawa (1994) distinguish
several learning stages as a result of different dependencies (e.g., to catch prey the animal must first
learn to open the mouth) and number of ”variables” involved. That is, reaching for prey involves
more motor synergies than opening the mouth, there are also several possible ways of achieving
it and more learning time is required to coordinate and adjust the overall synergy. Next let us
summarize the first stage, learning to open the mouth which is central for this article and appears
to be less idiosyncratic.
———– FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ———–
Innocenti and Nishikawa (1994) observed that the first successful mouth opening for toad #1
occurred on the 5th day after one practice session on the 16th trial following surgery. Toads #2
and #3 successfully opened their mouths on the day surgery was performed and on the 3rd day
on the first practice session on trial 2 and 1, respectively. Innocenti and Nishikawa (1994) and
Gleason and Nishikawa (1996) also observe a general overshooting of mouth opening in the first
learning trial after the lesion. In conclusion the first stage of learning to open the jaw appears to be
common to all toads and, though there are temporal differences during the learning process, some
aspects are common (e.g. first overshooting of mouth opening). After the lesion, the toad receives
no direct external reinforcement from the environment. So we have claimed that an expectation-
based strategy is one of the few viable ways the problem can be resolved (Corbacho, Nishikawa,
Weerasuriya, Liaw & Arbib, 2005a,b).
4.3 Constructive adaptive behaviors in Rana Computatrix
As already mentioned, Rana Computatrix consists of a set of evolving models of anuran adaptive
visuomotor coordination (Arbib 1987). Corbacho and Arbib (1995) focused on the structures in-
volved in the learning to detour behavior. Corbacho (1997) provided a wider repertoire of behaviors
in Rana Computatrix and Corbacho et al. (2005) emphasize the structures for learning to snap
prey-catching motor behavior after the Hypoglossal nerve lesion. In this paper we generalize both
cases within the SBL constructive architecture which is able to solve both problems with the exact
same constructive machinery.
4.3.1 Learning to Detour in Rana Computatrix
Corbacho and Arbib (1995) provided a basic schema-based model of learning to detour in Rana
computatrix. The initial seed schema architecture allows for coarse interaction with the environ-
ment (Figure 3). During the detour behavior, the involved perceptual schemas are SPREY , SSOR,
STACTILE , the sensorimotor schemas are SMHM , SBUMP−AV OID, and the involved motor schemas
are SFORWARD, SBACK−UP , SSIDE , SORIENT and SSNAP , which get activated at different times
during the interaction of the agent with the environment (Figure 3). In this paper, we provide
with only the strictly necessary details and refer the reader to the previous works for more detailed
descriptions. The prey recognition schema SPREY gets activated when there is a prey within the
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visual field of the animat and sends an excitatory attractant field to the motor heading map rep-
resented in schema SMHM . On the other hand, the stationary object recognition schema SSOR,
gets activated by the view of a stationary fence and sends an inhibitory repellent field to the motor
heading map. Hence, the motor heading map schema SMHM integrates both fields to determine a
course of action.
———– FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ———–
For the case of the animal avoiding the narrow pailing fence, as it has been already explained, a
plausible explanation is due to the motor heading map (MHM) integration hypothesis. That is,
when the prey attractant field goes beyond the narrow barrier repellent field (Figure 4A). Yet for
wider barriers, frogs are uncapable of avoiding the barrier and go forward against it. Again, a
plausible explanation might be due to the fact that the prey attractant field can not extend beyond
the wider repellent field projected by the 20-cm wide barrier as shown in Figure 4B.
———– FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ———–
Corbacho & Arbib (1995) informally introduced the notion of relational predictive schemas and
simply sketched out the construction of the detour schema under that context. In this regard,
many predictive schemas imply a sensorimotor map and a motor action. That is, they record the
effect of the motor action over the dynamic representation in a specific sensorimotor map. The
associations between the sensorimotor map schemas and the motor schemas (Sx, Sy) are learned
through cause-effect relations later explained in section 5.1 in this paper. So, for instance, the
activity pattern in the motor heading map mhm(t) can be affected by different motor schemas and
a different predictive schema is learned for each of this cause-effect relations.
Before learning has occurred, the frog goes straight to the center of the 20-cm wide barrier, hence
bumping into it. This tactile contact against the fences activates the SBUMP−AV OID schema which
in turn activates the SSIDE sidestep schema to avoid contact with the pailing fence immediately
in front of the agent. Eventually, during the interaction with the wide barrier a new cause-effect
relation is discovered between (SMHM , SSIDE) when the frog, after several sidesteps triggered by
the SBUMP−AV OID schema, happens to reach the end of the wide barrier and hence, the prey
suddenly and unexpectedly appears openly within its visual field. That is, the unexpected pattern
in the motor heading map, due to the view of the prey in the open field, triggers the new cause-
effect relation (SMHM , SSIDE) which in turn will cause the construction of the following predictive
and dual schemas:
ˆmhm(t+ 1) = MMHM,SIDEP (mhm(t), side(t), sor(t)) (8)
oSIDE,MHM (t) = MSIDE,MHM (mhm(t),mhm∗(t+ 1), sor(t)) (9)
These two new schemas explain how the frog can learn to detour around the barrier after
training with the 20-cm wide barrier has taken place. That is, after learning, when the frog is
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placed in front of the 20-cm wide barrier (the context) in the presence of prey, the sidestep schema
SSIDE is activated since it receives input from the dual schema SSIDE,MHM (eq. 9) and hence the
frog detours around the barrier. As already mentioned in section 3.2, the goal schema GPREY,MHM
produces the goal pattern of representation in the motor heading map mhm∗(t) in the presence
of prey, namely, it represents that in order to capture the prey, it must be centered within its
sensorimotor representation, that is the prey is ”within grasp” (prey(t)→ mhm∗(t)).
———– FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ———–
In turn, when the dual schema is activated, its associated predictive schema is also activated and
hence a predictive anticipatory pattern arises in the motor heading map, namely ˆmhm(t+ 1) (see
Figure 6).
———– FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE ———–
To summarize the overall information flow depicted in Figure 5, it all starts with the activation of
the schema SPREY due to the presence of a prey within the visual field of the frog; prey(t) in turn
activates the goal schema GPREY,MHM , that produces the goal pattern of activity mhm∗(t+ 1) for
the motor heading map SMHM . This goal pattern mhm∗(t + 1) in conjunction with activation of
the context by the activation of the schema SSOR, in turn activates the dual schema SSIDE,MHM
in charge of producing an input modulatory activity pattern oSIDE,MHM (t) for the motor schema
SSIDE to try to achieve the goal activity pattern mhm∗(t + 1). In parallel, the output activity
pattern of the SSIDE schema also causes the activation of the predictive schema PMHM,SIDE which,
then, produces the anticipatory pattern of activity ˆmhm(t+ 1) (Figure 6).
In terms of the adaptation of the specific schemas, in order for the system to reach coherence
with its environment (Corbacho & Arbib, 1996), there are two types of errors (Jordan & Rumelhart,
1992), the prediction error (mhm(t+ 1)− ˆmhm(t+ 1)), and the performance error (mhm∗(t+ 1)−
mhm(t + 1)); responsible for tuning the predictive and the dual schemas respectively within a
distal supervised learning paradigm. That is, the system faces a distal learning problem (Jordan
& Rumelhart, 1992) since, as already expressed, the parameters of the dual schema SSIDE,MHM
are adapted based on the error on the distal motor heading sensorimotor space, namely based on
the distal error (mhm∗(t+ 1)−mhm(t+ 1)).
Following sections of this paper will provide the general framework that allows the construction
of these two schemas. That is, section 5.1 will provide the cause-effect constructive dynamics to be
able to construct the association (SMHM , SSIDE) and sections 6.1 and 6.2 will explain the general
constructive architecture that allows for the new schemas PMHM,SIDE and SSIDE,MHM to be
constructed.
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4.3.2 Learning to Snap after the HG lesion in Rana Computrix
Analogously, to learning to detour, the innate seed schema architecture allows for coarse interaction
with the environment. Corbacho, Nishikawa, Weerasuriya, Liaw and Arbib (2005) provided a series
of two papers, in paper I the schema-based architecture was defined, and in paper II schema-based
learning after the HG lesion was described. In this paper we only provide the strictly necessary
abridged summary and refer the reader to the other papers for all the details on Rana Computatrix.
Figure 7 shows the initial seed schema-based architecture for learning to snap in Rana Computatrix.
It consists of perceptual schemas SPREY , SJAW REC , SHG REC , STONGUE REC , SDISTX , SDISTY ;
sensorimotor schemas SINT1, SLM , SDM , SHO, SGG, SLU , SHE ; and motor schemas SLEV ATE ,
SDEPRESS , SPROTRACT , SRETRACT , SLUNGE , SHEAD DOWN . For the purpose of this paper only
a subset of the schemas must be taken into account. Namely, SHG REC is the proprioceptive schema
reflecting the Hypoglossal nerve input signal. SLM and SDM represent premotor schemas for levator
and depressor motor schemas, SLEV ATE and SDEPRESS . During normal feeding behavior, due to
the input signal from HG, the levator peak of activity is delayed with respect to the depressor peak
of activity to allow for jaw opening as displayed in figure 2 bottom. As already specified, along
this paper we will use the simplified notation dm(t), lm(t) and jaw rec(t) to mean the output port
activity pattern from the SDM , SLM and SJAW REC schemas respectively.
———– FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE ———–
The temporal patterns of activity for every schema instance are displayed in Figure 8 when the
animal is catching prey before (Figure 8A) and after the HG lesion (Figure 8B). They display
catching a small prey with the tongue (coordinated control motor) pattern (TP) (left column in
both figures) and catching a large prey with the jaw pattern (JP) (right column). The tongue
pattern produces a farther activation of the tongue whereas the jaw pattern catches larger prey by
wider opening of the mouth and further lunging of the body (Corbacho, Nishikawa, Weerasuriya,
Liaw & Arbib, 2005a) The reader should pay special attention to the SHG REC , SJAW REC and
SLM schemas activity patterns for the purposes of this paper (represented in rows 3, 4 and 12
respectively). In this regard, the delay between the depressor peak of activity dm(t) and the
levator peak of activity lm(t) is related to body size. Thus, the control circuit needs to be adaptive
since the animal changes its size through its lifetime. This points to the existence of internal
adaptive models. So the system includes internal models which take efference copies (von Holst &
Mittelstaedt, 1950) of the neural commands (e.g. premotor SLM ) and provide the expected effect
of these commands. The system also includes a variety of sensory feedback, for flexible feedback
control, which are hereby shown to be useful for processes of adaptation as well (e.g. the jaw
muscle spindles SJAW REC). The expected feedback and the sensory feedback must be temporally
matched to reach coherence. For instance, the signal for the open jaw is delayed, that is, the muscle
spindle feedback occurs 30 to 50 msec after depressor premotor onset - mainly the time required
for muscle contraction. Hence, a learned transformation (through a internal model) is involved to
reach coherence between both signals since the efference copy will be different in both its structure
and onset timing from the sensory feedback signal.
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———– FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE ———–
Another crucial feature is the use of incoherence signals to drive the learning process. For example,
we shall see how the system can detect incoherences by subtracting the signal carrying the efference
copy about opening the mouth and the feedback signal from the jaw. In this regard, in section 7.1
we shall show how internal models can be learned and how the system can recover after a lesion
by structural learning thanks to the incoherences detected by the internal models.
During the lifetime of the animal (before the HG lesion) prey-catching reduces the hunger drive,
which is signaled by the prey in the mouth, so that when a prey is within the visual field a subgoal is
generated so that the jaw muscle spindles must eventually get activated, indicating that the mouth
is successfully open in order to allow the prey to get into the mouth. During goal learning, the
reinforcement signals enhance the elegibility of the projections from the prey recognition schema
to the jaw spindles goal pattern of activity representation (Corbacho, 1997). As already mentioned
in section 3.2, the goal schema GPREY,JAW REC gives rise to the desired state of the jaw (spindles)
when a particular prey is present, so that oPREY,JAW REC(t) = jaw rec∗(t + 1) represents the
desired output activity pattern for jaw rec(t + 1). Summarizing, this goal schema represents the
pattern of interaction that the mouth must be open (subgoal) in order to be able to capture the
prey (final goal associated to the hunger drive).
Also, during the interaction with the prey, a new cause-effect relation is discovered between
(SLM , SJAW REC) as it will be later explained in section 5.1. In this regard, during normal snapping
behavior a new pair of schemas is constructed (possibly among others), as it will be described in
sections 6.2 and 7.1. Namely,
ˆjaw rec(t+ 1) = MJAW REC,LMP (jaw rec(t), lm(t)) (10)
oLM,JAW REC(t) = MLM,JAW REC(jaw rec(t), jaw rec∗(t+ 1)) (11)
These two schemas explain how the frog can learn to snap after the HG lesion has taken place.
After the HG lesion has occurred, the frog does not open the mouth and hence an incoherence
occurs since the predictive schema P JAW REC,LM activates an expected pattern of activation in
the SJAW REC schema, namely ˆjaw rec(t+ 1). Also jaw rec(t) 6= 0 becomes a subgoal state since
it is in the way to reduce the hunger drive (the mouth must be open to capture the prey). In
this regard, the goal schema GPREY,JAW REC outputs the desired state of SJAW REC when SPREY
is active based on the parameters of the current prey (since prey(t) is the incentive for hunger).
Hence prey(t) activates and parametrizes the subgoal pattern of activity jaw rec(t+ 1)∗ which in
turn serves as input for other schemas, namely as input for the dual schema SLM,JAW REC .
———– FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE ———–
Figure 9 displays the information flow for the ”chain” of schemas prey(t)→ jaw rec∗(t+1)→ lm(t)
triggered by the goal schema GPREY,JAW REC and the dual schema SLM,JAW REC respectively.
This figure has the same topological configuration and information flow as that of figure 5 for
the case of learning to detour. Hence, proving the generality of the SBL constructive architecture
for different behavioral cases. Thus, after learning, when a prey is placed within snapping dis-
tance of the frog, the premotor LM schema SLM is activated since it receives modulatory input
oLM,JAW REC(t) from the dual schema SLM,JAW REC (equation 11), which in turn was activated
18
by the goal pattern of activity jaw rec∗(t + 1) (Figure 10). This new schema gives rise to the
corrective (modulatory) pattern of activity in lm(t) displayed in the third row in Figure 11. and
hence the frog is able to snap at the prey.
———– FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE ———–
In turn, when the dual schema is activated, its associated predictive schema is also activated and
hence, a predictive anticipatory pattern arises in ˆjaw rec(t). Again, as for the learning to detour
case, it is a distal learning problem, since the parameters of the dual schema must be adapted based
on the error produced on a distal sensorimotor space, namely (jaw rec∗(t+ 1)− jaw rec(t+ 1)).
———– FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE ———–
5 The Self-constructive brain is self-experimental
The brain is self-experimental since to ensure survival the self-constructive brain is an active ma-
chine capable of performing experiments of its own interactions with the environment as well as
capable of mentally simulating the results of those interactions in order to be able to later decide
the most optimal course of action. In this regard, the way for our brain to fully understand any-
thing is to model and simulate it. As Pezzulo (2008) has expressed, cognition is for doing, for
simulating. In order to understand its relation with the environment the brain constructs internal
models of reality that allow the brain to internally simulate its interactions with the environment.
Hence, the brain has the capacity to design experiments to be performed by interacting with the
environment as well as experiments inside the mind, for instance by mental practice, visualization
and simulation.
There is a growing body of experimental data that supports the idea of the self-experimental
brain. In this regard, experimental evidence indicates that animals can use mental simulation to
make decisions about the action to take during goal-directed navigation (Chersi, Donnarumma, &
Pezzulo, 2013). Its most salient characteristic is that choices about actions are made by simulating
movements and their sensory effects using the same brain areas that are active during overt exe-
cution. Chersi et al. (2013) link these results with a general framework that sees the brain as a
predictive device that can detach itself from the here-and-now of current perception using mecha-
nisms such as episodic memories, motor and visual imagery. In this regard, the concept of action
simulation is gaining momentum in cognitive science, neuroscience, and robotics, and in particular
within the study of grounded, embodied and motor cognition (Declerck, 2013; Hesslow, 2012; Raos,
Evangeliou & Saraki, 2007; Jeannerod, 2001; Mohan, Sandini & Morasso, 2014; Pezzulo, Candini,
Dindo, & Barca, 2013).
The ability to construct a hypothetical situation in one’s imagination prior to it actually oc-
curring may afford greater accuracy in predicting its eventual outcome. The recollection of past
experiences is also considered to be a re-constructive process with memories recreated from their
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component parts (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Construction, therefore, plays a critical role in al-
lowing us to plan for the future and remember the past. Conceptually, construction can be broken
down into a number of constituent processes although little is known about their neural correlates.
Moreover, it has been suggested that some of these processes may be shared by a number of other
cognitive functions including spatial navigation and imagination. Recently, novel paradigms have
been developed that allow for the isolation and characterization of these underlying processes and
their associated neuroanatomy. Hassabis & Maguire (2009) selectively review this fast-growing
literature and consider some implications for remembering the past and predicting the future. In
this regard, mental practice is the cognitive rehearsal of a physical skill in the absence of overt
physical movement (Jordan, 1983). The questions arises whether mental practice enhances perfor-
mance (Driskell, Copper & Moran, 1994; Gentili, Han, Schweighofer & Papaxanthis, 2010; Miall
& Wolpert, 1996). Mental practice promotes motor anticipation as for example there is evidence
from skilled music performance.
On the other hand, mental imagery can be described as the maintenance and manipulation
of perception and actions of a covert sort, i. e., it arises not as a consequence of environmental
interaction but is created internally by the brain (Di Nuovo, Marocco, Di Nuovo & Cangelosi;
2013; Kossyln, Gani & Thompson, 2001; Lallee & Dominey, 2013; Svensson, Thill & Ziemke,
2013). According to the simulation hypothesis, mental imagery can be explained in terms of
predictive chains of simulated perceptions and actions, i.e., perceptions and actions are reactivated
internally by our nervous system to be used in mental imagery and other cognitive phenomena
(Chersi, Donnarumman & Pezzulo, 2013; Hesslow, 2002, 2012; Svensson, Thill & Ziemke, 2013).
In this regard, Svensson, Thill & Ziemke (2013) go a step further and hypothesize that dreams
informing the construction of simulations lead to faster development of good simulations during
waking behavior.
Certain type of generative models such as the wake-sleep type algorithms (Hinton, Dayan, Frey
& Neal, 1995) are composed of forward connections as well as backward connections which can
give rise to mental visualizations. That is, during the sleep generative phase, phantasy patterns
corresponding to visualizations can be generated thanks to the information flow generated by the
backward projection. In the same way, we show that predictive schemas are capable of producing
anticipatory activity patterns as the result of mental modeling. In this regard, we have shown in
figure 6 anticipatory (phantasy) activity pattern in the motor heading map ( ˆmhm(t + 1)) during
learning to detour. Also in figure 11, we have displayed internally simulated activity patterns in
pre-motor neurons ( ˆlm(t + 1)) during learning after the hypoglossal nerve lesion. The prediction
of states of the body has also been shown to be a useful capability in resilient robots (Bongard,
Zykov, & Lipson, 2006) and it has been suggested that this could be generalized to internal models
of the environment (Adami, 2006).
We have already introduced internal models in section 2.1 and their SBL implementation, pre-
dictive and dual schemas in section 3.1. Predictive schemas allow for mental modeling. That is,
they allow the system to anticipate the results of an action before it is taken. That is, predic-
tive schemas produce anticipatory representations of events/effects that have no yet occurred in
the outside environment. That is, the self-experimental brain produces anticipatory experimental
patterns of activity. Yet the question remains as to how the predictive schemas are constructed.
In this regard, cause-effect experimentation triggers the construction of predictive schemas and its
corresponding dual schemas. Hence, a very important component of the self-experimental brain
consists on the ability to simulate the causal flow of the interactions with the environment and,
thus, learn cause-effect relations from the potentially combinatorially large set of hypothesis. In
learning new causal relations by experimentation, the potentially combinatorial explosion is con-
strained by interacting with the environment. In an analogous manner as constraint relaxation
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dynamics reduce an exponential space into a more tractable space of possible configurations. Next,
we will introduce the mechanisms to learn the effective cause-effect relations within a complex
system (e.g. brain, autonomous agent).
5.1 Constructing Cause-Effect relations
In this section we propose learning mechanisms that will be able to construct the cause-effect
relations from the combinatorially large relational space. As already indicated, these cause-effect
relations will in turn allow for mental simulation and experimentation. To decide on a cause-
effect relation between two schemas Sx and Sy we will use some measure of delayed similarity of
the activity patterns out of their output ports during a time interval i.e. ox[ta, tb] and o
y[ta +
τ, tb + τ ] respectively. In general we will assume that any schema connects to any other schema
through several connections, we assume that these different connections will have different ”delay
properties”, thus giving rise to different responses in different connections. We now define the
instantaneous degree of cause-effect relation between two patterns ox(t) and oy(t), at a point in
time t by the following measure
cx,yτ (t) = Θ[o
x(t)] ·Θ[oy(t)]− αdx,yτ (t) (12)
where
dx,yτ (t) = (o
y(t− τ)− ox(t))2 (13)
Θ[x] =
{
1 if x 6= 0
0 otherwise
Two signals may not be very similar in their fine temporal structure yet they might be similar in
their qualitative behavior, that is, when one is active the other is also active, when one is large the
other is large, when one is growing the other is growing, and so on. If one of the signals is inactive
and the other is active the connection is decreased, so we implement a sort of AND operation, that
is, if both are active the first term in equation 12 becomes 1, hence increasing the weight in the
first case and decreasing the weight otherwise. At the end only those that maintain a recurrent
and constant delay relation remain. The threshold factors avoid correlations among layers that
are both inactive. Since when both are inactive the first term becomes 0 as both its factors are
0 and the second term is also 0. On the other hand, if one is active and the other is inactive the
”distance” of both signals becomes αdx,yτ (t). Finally if both are active their ”similarity” becomes
1− αdx,yτ (t).
The second phase consists of calculating how reliable the instantaneous cause-effect relation is
within a time interval [t0, tn]. This is calculated by
rx,yτ (t+ 1) = r
x,y
τ (t) + βc
x,y
τ (t) (14)
so that at the end of the training period the measure of the similarity of both signals will be
approximated by rx,yτ (tN ) = β
∑tn
t=t0
cx,yτ (t) When a correlation is not ”reliable” it will be positive
in certain occasions and negative in others, thus, overall the reliability measure will be close to 0.
From now on r denotes the matrix with components rx,yτ . The delays between actions and sensory
feedback are reflected on r. When a cause-effect correlation is reliable (above a certain threshold)
the cause schema becomes the schema that outputs oy(t), namely Sy. and the ”effect”schema
becomes the schema that outputs ox(t), namely Sx. Hence, giving rise to the construction of a new
predictive schema PX,Y . SBL also constructs its corresponding dual schema SY,X in parallel to be
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able to re-construct a previous successful pattern of interaction.
———– FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE ———–
To facilitate understanding let us first analyze a simplified case. Consider five schemas, three of
which are motor schemas A, B, C and two of which are perceptual schemas 1, 2. Suppose there is
only a cause-effect relation between motor schema B and perceptual schema 1 with a delay τ2; and
a cause-effect relation between motor schema C and perceptual schema 2 with a delay τ1. Figure
12 represents the cause-effect relations among these three motor schemas and these two perceptual
schemas. To farther exemplify suppose that perceptual schema 1 is sensory feedback from the jaw
muscles and perceptual schema 2 corresponds to ”prey on view field”. On the other hand, suppose
that motor schema A is sidestep, motor schema B corresponds to open mouth, and motor schema
C corresponds to ”lunge tongue”. It should be clear in this example that there is only a cause-effect
relation between the schemas ”open mouth” and sensory feedback from the jaw with a certain time
delay; and the schemas sidestep and ”prey on view field” with a probably different time delay.
Returning to our adaptable prey-catching case, Figure 13 displays r under different conditions
(A: after tongue prehension (TP), B: after jaw prehension (JP), and C: after both tongue and jaw
prehension). Again, the delays between actions and sensory feedback are reflected on r. For instance
the fourth row in the fourth column of the second block in Figure 13A reflects the relationship
between jaw rec(t) and lm(t) as being delayed by 30 msec (each displayed row corresponds to a
delay increment of 10 msec, i.e. 0., 10, 20, 30 msec., and so on). The reader may have already
suspected that some motor programs involve almost simultaneous activation of several motor units.
This raises the problem where accidental correlations may be found. One of the ways the system is
able to uncouple the ”accidental” pairings occurs when some of the components are active in one
motor program but not in another. A couple of examples may serve to illustrate the point. The
initial accidental pairing (lu(t), jaw rec(t)) during Jaw Prehension is resolved by the uncoupling
during Tongue Prehension since during TP lu(t) is very small or inexistent whereas jaw(t) rec is
very active. In the same way the initial accidental pairing (gg(t), jaw rec(t)) is resolved by the
uncoupling during Jaw Prehension, so that although correlated under one motor program they are
de-correlated under another one. Another source of disambiguation comes from the constraint on
the reliability of the delay between the cause and the effect across ”training samples”. As Figure
13C displays, after the animal has performed both TP and JP a set of predictive schemas has
been formed that represent the internal models of interaction. They reflect reliable cause-effect
relationships that have been found between schemas output ports. For instance, the following
predictive schemas have been formed: PDISTX,LU and P JAW REC,LM .
———– FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE ———–
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6 The Self-constructive brain is self-growing
The brain builds itself up, that is, it constructs new patterns of interaction and representation on
the run, as it needs them in order to better understand and build its own interpretation of the envi-
ronment. In order to do so, it grows new specific structures by recruiting dormant overgeneralized
structures and instantiating them by specific features that represent specific patterns of interaction
with the environment. In this regard, prey-catching gives rise to many different extremely relevant
(for survival) patterns of interaction with the environment and hence, it is a very good testbed to
analyze the construction of representations of patterns of interaction which we here formalize as
the construction of new schemas.
The next two subsections describe firstly schema construction in learning to detour, and sec-
ondly the generalized constructive architecture which will be also later applied to learning to snap.
We hereby describe and formalize schema construction which is a central component of the SCB
since it is the mechanism that allows the incremental and dynamic building of representations of
relevant patterns of interaction with the environment. Hence, allowing the successful construction
of the animat’s reality.
6.1 Schema construction during Learning to Detour
As it was already explained in section 4.3.1, Corbacho and Arbib (1995) provided a schema-based
model of learning to detour in Rana computatrix and we here generalize and formalize this behavior
within the SBL constructive architecture. In this regard, as already expressed, many predictive
schemas imply a sensory or sensorimotor map Sx which is affected by a motor schema Sy. The
associations (Sy, Sx) are learned through cause-effect relations already explained in section 5.1 in
this paper. For instance, the activity pattern in mhm(t) can be affected by different motor and pre-
motor schemas and a different predictive schema is learned for each of these cause-effect relations.
In this regard, during learning to detour a new predictive schema is constructed as already explained
in section 4.3.1. During the learning process there is a discontinuity, that is, a surprise arises. When
the frog is relatively close to the end of the barrier, a sidestep action suddenly takes the frog out
of the barrier and leaves the prey in the open field. This immediately gives rise to an unexpected
pattern of activity in mhm(t), that is the SMHM schema gets unexpectedly activated. During that
event, given a previously inactive SMHM , the activation of the sidestep schema gives rise to an
unexpected pattern of activity in mhm(t), and this triggers the cause-effect dynamics which define
the effect schema Sx = SMHM and the cause schema Sy = SSIDE ; and a new predictive schema
is constructed, namely PMHM,SIDE as well as its corresponding dual schema SSIDE.MHM , both
already introduced in section 4.3.1. The other ingredient to determine the predictive schema is the
definition of the context. To define the context, first the space(s) have to be defined, secondly the
specific patterns that determine the specific context. To define the context the systems gathers
statistics by the cause-effect learning dynamics (Corbacho, 1997). Next section describes the general
schema construction machinery and exemplifies it with the learning to detour case.
6.2 Schema Construction: generalized architecture
In general, to construct a new schema, three aspects must be determined: when, what, and how;
which determine the components and the configuration for the new schema(s). First of all, the
brain must realize when there is the need to construct (a) new schema(s). In this regard, both the
incoherence (prediction error) and the performance error will serve as the triggers under specific
conditions, as it will be explained below. The next step consists of realizing what can take the
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system back to coherence and closer to the goal. This implies determining what components
(what) and in which topological configuration (how) will make up the new schema. Hence, let
us first examine in detail the conditions that lead to the construction of a new schema as well as
determine what other component schemas play a role in the constructive process.
Conditions for Schema Construction: As already explained, SBL attempts to maximize co-
herence, that is, reduce the prediction error, and, at the same time, maximize performance. In
this regard, structural learning processes are triggered when specific types of incoherences are de-
tected. When an incoherence arises, SBL distinguishes between an incorrect expectation (I), versus
a completely unexpected event (U). In turn, unexpected can be generated in two cases: (U1) by a
new predictive cause-effect relation discovered by the cause-effect dynamics (as described in section
5.1); and (U2) when there is an incoherence, that is, the predictive response does not match the
actual observed response (ox(t + 1) − oˆx,y(t + 1)) 6= 0 and, at the same time, either the cause or
the effect schemas are inactive, i.e., oy(t)ox(t+ τ) = 0.
In both of those situations, two sub-cases must be further distinguished, namely, one occurs
when the unexpected pattern of interaction is accompanied with the system getting closer to a goal
(case A), and the second case, when it is accompanied with the system getting farther away from
a goal (case B). In the first case, the system should attempt to ”record” the ”configuration” that
gave rise to that interaction. Whereas in the second case, the system must make sure to avoid
the current pattern of interaction and re-construct some previous successful pattern (or construct
alternative strategies (Corbacho, 1997). Specifically, in learning to detour the system is on the
first case (i.e. U1.A: unexpected pattern of interaction accompanied with the system getting closer
to the goal) as it will be farther elaborated below. On the other hand, learning after the lesion
corresponds to case (U2.B) since the lesion causes a prediction error due to the inactivation of the
effect schema. In this case, previous successful pattern re-construction is necessary to achieve the
goal.
Returning to the learning to detour case, as explained in sections 4.3.1 and 5.1, the unex-
pected pattern of activity in mhm(t) triggers the cause-effect constructive machinery, second the
cause-effect machinery determines the association (SSIDE , SMHM ), third new schemas and schema
mappings are constructed to represent the successful pattern of interaction. Hence, the cause-effect
learning dynamics determines the existing schemas implicated in the construction processes of the
new schemas, namely: the effect schema is instantiated by Sx = SMHM , and the cause schema
is instantiated by Sy = SSIDE . Thus, the new predictive schema P x,y and its new dual schema
Sy,x components and their topological configuration are determined as it will be specified below.
Also implicated in the construction process are the goal schema Gz,x = GPREY,MHM (related to
the active effect schema) and the perceptual schema Sz = SPREY (related to the previous goal
schema). That is, the chain of related schemas plays an important role in the constructive process
as it is shown in figure 14.
Constructing new predictive schema P x,y: As already explained in section 3.1, once the effect
Sx and the cause schema Sy have been determined, the predictive schema behavioral specification
is defined by a mapping Mx,yP parametrized by W
x,y
P (t), such that
oˆx,y(t+ 1) = Mx,yP (o
x(t), oy(t), ov(t); Wx,yP (t)) (15)
24
The new predictive schema recruits the dormant structure and parametrizes Wx,yP (t)) accordingly.
Returning to the learning to detour case, this general equation becomes instantiated by
ˆmhm(t+ 1) = MMHM,SIDEP (mhm(t), side(t), sor(t); W
MHM,SIDE
P ) (16)
where adaptation of WMHM,SIDEP allows to incrementally reduce (mhm(t+ 1)− ˆmhm(t+ 1)).
Also its dual schema Sy,x gets constructed in parallel. The dual schema requires as input a
goal pattern that must be provided by a goal schema. In this regard, the goal schema Gz,x learned
in previous successful interactions outputs the ”goal” activity pattern for schema Sx as already
explained in section 3.2. That is, in the learning to detour case, the specific goal activity pattern
corresponds to mhm∗(t+ 1).
Constructing new dual schema Sy,x: This new schema’s role is to produce the ”optimal”
pattern of activity in the cause schema Sy that will in turn give rise, though the cause-effect
dynamics, to the goal pattern of activity in the effect schema Sx (that is mhm∗(t+ 1) in the case
of learning to detour). The components of the new schema Sy,x are as follows:
< Iplist >: The first input port is of the same type and connected to the output port of the
effect schema Sx, i.e. iy,x1 (t) = o
x(t), the second input port is of the same type and connected to
the output port of Goal schema Gz,x, i.e. iy,x2 (t) = o
∗z,x(t + 1). The third input port corresponds
to context information; i. e. iy,x3 (t) = o
v(t)
< Oplist >: the output port is of the same type as Sy input port and connected to the adapted
cause schema Sy
′
(defined below).
< Behavior >: the system must produce a modulatory activity pattern input to the adapted
cause schema Sy
′
(defined below) such that it will make the pattern ox(t) in the effect schema Sx
get closer to the goal pattern o∗z,x(t+ 1) set by the goal schema Gz,x, that is
oy,x(t) = My,x(ox(t), o∗z,x(t+ 1), ov(t); Wy,x(t)) (17)
This is analogous to learning the inverse model in distal supervised learning (Jordan & Rumelhart,
1992). That is, as already indicated, in the learning to detour case, the schema SSIDE,MHM tries
to diminish the error in the distal sensorimotor space (mhm∗(t+ 1)−mhm(t+ 1).
oSIDE,MHM (t) = MSIDE,MHM (mhm(t),mhm∗(t+ 1), sor(t); WSIDE,MHM (t)) (18)
The cause schema Sy receives a new modulatory input from the dual schema Sy,x since the dual
schema outputs an optimal pattern of activity for Sy under a specific context. Hence, the cause
schema is adapted to instantiate this new modulatory input under a specific pattern of interaction.
These modulatory loops have been shown to have already evolved in lower vertebrates (Ewert, et
al., 1999; Ewert, et al., 2001; Ewert, et al., 2006).
———– FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE ———–
Thus, in the learning to detour case, the dual schema creates a modulatory input pattern of activity
oSIDE,MHM (t), that becomes input to the SSIDESTEP schema. In this regard, the SSIDESTEP co-
ordinated control motor program was previously activated by the SBUMP−AV OID schema and now
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also receives another input activation. In this regard, every schema receives different modulatory
input channels that get particularly instantiated during the schema construction process.
Adapting Schema Sy into Sy
′
: Cause schema Sy is adapted to instantiate a new modulatory
input port from the dual schema (represented by dashed lines in Figures 14 and 15). In turn, it
adapts its behavioral specification as now it has to take into account this instantiated modulatory
signal.
< Iplist >: They are the same as in Sy (i.e. k input ports) in addition to a newly instantiated
modulatory input port. The modulatory input port is of the same type and connects to the output
port of the dual schema Sy,x (hence carrying the modulatory term), iy
′
k+1(t) = o
y,x(t)
< Oplist >: They are the same as in Sy.
< Behavior >: The behavioral specification remains the same as in Sy but two extra assignment
expressions are instantiated at the very end of the behavioral specification to take into account
the new modulatory input signal that serves to reconstruct the pattern of activity proven to be
successful in the past in similar conditions, namely,
øy
′
(t) =
{
iy
′
k+1(t) if i
y′
k+1(t) 6= 0
oy(t) otherwise
That is, if there is no modulatory input, the output port assignment remains as in the original
schema Sy. Yet, if there is any modulatory input, then the output port assignment corresponds to
the input objective modulatory input 2.
Returning to the learning to detour case, the dual schema creates a modulatory input pattern
of activity oSIDE,MHM (t), that gets integrated in the SSIDE schema to generate side(t). That
is, SSIDE,MHM sends a modulatory activity pattern to SSIDE , which activates the SSIDE schema
under a specific context (i.e. in presence of the barrier signaled by activation of SSOR). This, in
turn, produces an anticipatory pattern in ˆmhm(t + 1) due to the predictive schema (as displayed
in figure 6) although, initially, the motor heading map activity was null due to the presence of the
stationary barrier (i.e. mhm(t) = 0).
In summary, a global picture of this process of schema construction is depicted in Figure 14.
It includes the predictive schema P x,y and its associated dual schema Sy,x, as well as the involved
goal schema Gz,x. As already explained, for the particular case of learning to detour, they are
instantiated by Sy = SSIDE , Sx = SMHM , and Sz = SPREY . Also, a global picture of the
generalized process of schema(s) construction is depicted in Figure 15. In the next section, we will
show how learning after a lesion can also be explained with this very same constructive process.
———– FIGURE 15 ABOUT HERE ———–
2As already expressed, for the sake of clarity and simplification for this article, we assume that only one
predictive and its corresponding dual schema are instantiated for each specific active motor schema. Hence,
avoiding issues of integration (linear on nonlinear). Thus, oˆx(t) = oˆx,y(t), oy(t) = oy,x(t) and equation 19
can be simplified to reflect this assumption.
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7 The Self-constructive brain is self-repairing
The brain has an outstanding capacity to recover from many different types of injuries. We present
a case in lower vertebrates, specifically how anurans are capable of recovering their snapping ca-
pabilities after suffering a lesion of their Hypoglossal nerve as explained in section 4.2. Corbacho
et al. (2005) introduced a partial model of this phenomena within the schema-based modeling
framework. We claim that in order to do so, the brain needs to re-construct a previous pattern of
activity thanks to the construction of internal predictive models.
In this regard, Innocenti and Nishikawa’s (1994) as well as Gleason and Nishikawa (1996) studies
on motor learning following hypoglossal transection in toads show that the individual learning
process is quite idiosyncratic. That is, each toad seems to develop its own solution to the problem.
The adaptation of the motor output may depend highly on the particular features of the prey and
the particular physical configuration of the agent itself. Thus, the same minimal initial structure
will give rise to very different brains if posed on very different environments, since the brains is
self-constructive. Thus, the system has the tools to build the ”vehicle” but which ”vehicle” it builds
depends on the environment it faces and its previous history of interactions.
The previously presented schema-based learning framework is very helpful as the basis for
structural learning, that is, learning a new topological structure within the brain. SBL includes
structural learning since it implies the construction of new structures and relations. This is in
contrast to pure parameter learning where the structure is fixed and a set of parameters is adapted.
Due to space limitations we will focus on the particular case when a complex system/agent un-
dergoes lesioning of one of its subcomponents and the system must learn a structural change that
allows the system to recover its initial functionality.
We, as designers, may know the effect of a particular lesion. On the other hand, it appears
obvious that natural systems can not have any direct knowledge of its own internal relations other
than through observation of its own dynamics. In this regard, we have already discussed that,
initially, the system may not have any relation between pre-motor SLM , SDM and proprioceptive
SJAW REC and, only through results of interactions, these cause-effect relations can be learned.
In Corbacho, Nishikawa, Liaw and Arbib (1996) the necessary components and their interrelation
already existed and learning was just a matter of tuning the existing structures. Yet, this poses
a combinatorial problem since not all possible projections can be contemplated a priori, specially
in a hierarchical system, where incremental construction is open ended since the environment is
dynamic and partially unpredictable. In this paper, we describe the construction of new schemas
(not determined a priori) under the SBL paradigm. In this regard, we have already explained
in section 5.1 how the cause-effect dynamics trigger the construction of internal models by first
determining the cause-effect relations among different schema mappings. Then, in section 6.2, we
have also described how the predictive schema and its dual schemas can be learned to represent
these relevant patterns of interaction. We claim that these internal models also allow the system to
recover after a lesion (Adami, 2006; Bongard, Zykov & Lipson, 2006; Corbacho, 1997; Corbacho,
Nishikawa, Weerasuriya Liaw & Arbib, 2005b).
7.1 Pattern (re)-construction to recover from lesion
We have previously shown how during normal prey capture, the systems builds a predictive schema
P JAW REC,LM recording the effects of the pre-motor schema SLM on the proprioceptive schema
SJAW REC . That is, the SCB builds internal models of its own dynamics that will allow for better
future performance as well as provide for more robust and resilient dynamics (Bongard, Zykov
& Lipson, 2006; Corbacho & Arbib, 1997a). Subsequently, after the hypoglossal lesion has taken
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place, the animal is not able to open the mouth while attempting to capture the prey. Hence,
the system reaches an incoherence, i. e. a prediction error (jaw rec(t + 1)− ˆjaw rec(t+ 1)) 6= 0,
determining a cause schema SLM (Sy) that happens to be active (as expressed by its output port
lm(t) 6= 0) and an effect schema SJAW REC (Sx) that remains inactive (i.e. jaw rec(t + 1) = 0).
Thus, corresponding to the case U2.B for schema construction, as explained in section 6.2. The
system has also performed an unsuccessful interaction as indicated by the fact that it is getting
away from one of its goals, since the goal schema GPREY,JAW REC (Gz,y) outputs a goal state
jaw rec∗(t+ 1) reflecting the desired state of jaw rec(t+ 1), yet, both patterns are not becoming
closer.
We suggest that learning after the lesion corresponds to the re-construction of the activity
pattern similar to that created by SLM during successful prey capture before the lesion. The dual
schema’s role would be to reestablish that activity pattern in SLM so that the jaw opens and hence
SJAW REC gets properly active. In this regard, the dual schema SLM,JAW REC (learned in parallel
to the predictive P JAW REC,LM ) outputs the ”optimal” activity pattern for the cause schema SLM .
As already explained for the learning to detour case, the dual schema creates a modulatory input
pattern of activity for the SLM schema. This is so, since every schema receives different modulatory
input channels that get particularly instantiated during the construction process.
Figure 16 provides the detailed schema construction process with respect to the cause schema Sy
and the effect schema Sx for generality reasons. The specific pattern of interaction during learning
to snap, after the lesion, is instantiated by Sy = SLM , Sx = SJAW REC and Sz = SPREY . Figure
16, has the exact same topological structure as that of Figure 15 for the case of schema construction
in learning to detour. Hence, again proving the generality of the constructive architecture presented
in this paper.
———– FIGURE 16 ABOUT HERE ———–
8 Conclusions
This paper presents adaptive behavior as emerging from the self-constructive nature of the brain.
The brain builds itself up by reflecting on its particular interactions with the environment, that
is, it constructs its own interpretation of reality through the construction of representations of
relevant predictive patterns of interaction. Thus, we claim that the brain is the architect of its
own reality. In this regard, we formalize the constructive architecture of the brain within the
schema-based learning framework. We introduce the predictive (cf. forward internal models) and
its dual schemas as active processes capturing relevant patterns of interaction; and we suggest that
the brain is composed of myriads of these patterns as well as their dual predictive internal models
associated. These internal models exist all over the brain and a variety of examples can be found
in the literature regarding different brain areas/functionalities (visual, sensorimotor, motor, etc.).
Yet, these only represent the ”tip of the iceberg’, since they are all over all the different brain
structures because they are the result of a central principle of organization. The existence of all
these predictive internal models in the brain can be observed through many anticipatory activity
patterns. We claim that this anticipatory activity patterns are emergent of this type of constructive
architecture as reported in this paper showing anticipatory responses in sensorimotor and motor
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maps. We also claim that a constructive architecture must be in place in order to construct and
organize all these predictive patterns of interaction.
This paper suggests that the brain is SCB since it is self-experimental, self-growing, and self-
repairing. The brain is self-experimental since to ensure survival the self-constructive brain is an
active machine capable of performing experiments of its own interactions with the environment
as well as capable of mentally simulating the results of those interactions in order to be able to
later decide the most optimal course of action. Anticipation plays an important role in directing
intelligent behavior under a fundamental hypothesis that the brain constructs reality as much as
it embodies it. The brain is also self-growing, since it dynamically and incrementally constructs
internal structures in order to incrementally build a model of the world as it gathers statistics from
its interactions with the environment. Finally, the brain is also self-repairing since, to survive, it
must also be robust and capable of self-organization and self-repair, that is, the brain is capable
of finding ways to repair parts of previously working structures and hence re-construct a previous
successful pattern of interaction.
In this paper we have also introduced some of the main components of the SBL constructive
architecture and claim that they can provide an explanation for some of the learning occurring
during development as well as after lesioning. In this regard, toads grow 100 times (e.g. from
0.5 grm to 50 grm) during their lifetime, so the system has to be intrinsically adaptable and
flexible. Additionally, the recovery after lesioning of the Hypoglossal nerve indicates that toads
are also capable of structural learning by constructing new strategies based on ingredients of past
successful interactions. Hence, we have shown that constructive learning processes underlie the
adaptability displayed by anurans and that they can be modeled within the SBL framework.
8.1 Discussion
Many researchers have clarified that intelligence resides in the circular relationship between the
brain of an individual organism, its body, and the environment (Beer, 1995; Chiel & Beer, 1997;
Nolfi & Floreano, 2000; Nolfi, Ikegami, & Tani, 2008; Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999; Tani, 1996; Varela,
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). Also, an increasing number of research directions emphasize the em-
bodied agent framework (Brooks & Stein, 1994; Husbands, 2009; Lund, 2014). In this regard,
different cognitive theories also emphasize the dynamic and interactive role of the brain and the
environment (Barandian, & Moreno, 2006; Clark, 1997; Clark, & Grush, 1999; Di Paolo, Baran-
diaran, Beaton & Buhrmann, 2013; Nolfi & Tani, 1999; van Duijn, Keijzer, & Franken, 2006;
Vakarelov, 2011).
This paper definitely emphasizes the importance of the closed interaction loop between the
agent and its environment in a dynamical way. Future work will farther emphasize the relation
to the rest of the organism. The SCB is an intrinsic and inherent part of the overall agent as the
agent physical configuration changes throughout the lifetime of the agent and hence the SCB must
correspondingly adapt its internal models dynamically. In this regard, Innocenti and Nishikawa’s
(1994) as well as Gleason and Nishikawa (1996) studies on motor learning following hypoglossal
transection in toads show that the individual learning process is quite idiosyncratic. That is, each
toad, depending on its physical configuration, seems to develop its own solution to the problem. In
order to do so, self-modeling is required within the SCB framework. Nevertheless, the first stage
of learning to open the jaw appears to be common to all toads and, though there are temporal
differences during the learning process, some aspects are common (e.g. first overshooting of mouth
opening). After the lesion the toad receives no direct external reinforcement from the environment.
So we have claimed that an expectation-based strategy is one of the few viable ways the problem
can be solved (Corbacho, Nishikawa, Liaw, & Arbib, 1996).
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We claim that the SCB principles (self-experimental, self-growing and self-repairing) are evolu-
tionary principles that have evolved in many different species, not just in mammals. That is, these
principles can be clearly observed at different levels of abstraction and simple implementations are
found even in lower vertebrates. So for instance, anuran’s brain capacity for recovering a behavioral
pattern of interaction after a critical lesion demonstrates their capacity for self-repair. Self-growing
and self-experimental, on the other hand, can also be tested by their ability to learn certain prob-
lems such as learning to detour through the use of internal models. In this regard, this paper
provides evidence in anurans and provides its computational counterpart in Rana Computatrix.
This paper has also emphasized the individual’s self-construction of reality, yet the construction
of reality has important social implications in higher species (Arbib & Hesse, 1986; Butz, 2008;
Piaget, 1954). The agent lives in a society and the interaction with other agents plays an important
role in the agent dynamics. Future work involves the extension to include social interactions. In
this regard, an increasing body of research deals with the formalization of social interactions. For
instance, Di Paolo & De Jaegher (2012) introduce the interactive brain hypothesis in order to
map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neuronal processes. This
hypothesis, among other things, states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in
both the development and current function of social brain mechanisms, even in cases where social
understanding happens in the absence of immediate interaction. In this regard, mirror neurons have
been related to what to expect from other agents by direct observation, that is, they are related to
the expectation of other agents’ actions. Hence, internal forward models have also been related to
mirror neuron systems (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Orzop, Kawato & Arbib, 2013; Orzop, Wolpert
& Kawato, 2005; Tani, Ito, & Sugita, 2004) and predictive coding (Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007).
In turn, mirror neurons have been related to the evolution of language (Arbib, 2002, 2005, 2014).
Also, in the field of autonomous robots, Steels and Spranger (2008) explain how autonomous robots
can construct a body image of themselves and how this internal mental model, in turn, can help
in motor control, planning and in recognizing actions performed by other agents.
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Figures and Table Captions
Figure 1. Behavioral observations showing the frog interacting with different pailing fence barrier
configurations in the presence of prey. (A) Approach to prey with 10-cm. wide barrier interposed.
(B) Approach to prey with 20-cm. wide barrier interposed: first trial (numbers indicate the suc-
cession of the movements). (C) Approach to prey with 20-cm. wide barrier interposed after four
learning trials. Arrowheads indicate position and orientation of the frog following a single contin-
uous movement, after which the frog pauses.
Figure 2. Electromyographic activity of the mandibular depressors (DM) and levators (LM)
during snapping behavior before(Left) and after (Right) bilateral transection of the ramus hy-
poglossus (HG). The onset of activity is nearly simultaneous both before and after surgery. Before
transection, the depressors reach their peak of activity on average 86.7 ms earlier than the lev-
ators . After transection, the peak of activity of the levators occurs nearly simultaneously with
the peak of activity of the depressors. [From Nishikawa and Roth 1991; reprinted with permission.]
Figure 3. Initial seed schema-based architecture for learning to detour. For the purpose of
this paper, pay special attention to the prey recognition and stationary object recognition (SOR)
schemas which get integrated in the motor heading map (MHM). Also the bumping avoidance
schema is implemented by tactile input sending a reorienting signal to the MHM.
Figure 4. Activity patterns in the motor heading map mhm(t), displaying the motor heading
map integration. (A) for the 10-cm wide barrier. (B) for the 20-cm wide barrier.
Figure 5. Information flow for learning to detour. This diagram provides a schematic repre-
sentation of the schema activation flow and how information patterns flow in the schema network.
The adaptation modules to reduce the prediction error (mhm(t + 1) − ˆmhm(t + 1)) and the per-
formance error (mhm∗(t+ 1)−mhm(t+ 1)) are displayed aside the signal flow to avoid cluttering
the image for clarity reasons. Delay lines are represented by D.
Figure 6. Anticipatory activity pattern in ˆmhm(t+1) as a result of the activation of the predictive
schema PMHM,SIDE in the presence of prey and in the context of the barrier, i.e. the schema SSOR
is activated and setting up the context.
Figure 7. Initial seed schema-based architecture for learning to snap. Namely, control circuitry
for depressor mandibularis, levator mandibularis, tongue protractor, tongue retractor, head ventro-
flexion and lunging. Some of the neural network structure is simplified to allow for inclusion of
lunge and head down flexion MPGs as well as the corresponding sensory feedback. For the purpose
of this paper pay special attention to premotor DM and LM in charge of mouth opening.
Figure 8 Temporal pattern of activity for each schema instance. Motor pattern when feeding
on prey (A) before and (B) right after the bilateral Hypoglossal transection. The left column re-
flects the prey catching pattern for TP and the right column reflects the JP pattern. The first
rows display the temporal pattern of activity corresponding to the different perceptual schemas:
PREY REC, PREY NORM, HG REC, JAW REC, TONGUE REC, DISTX, DISTY, respectively.
The next row displays the activity of the interneuron INT1. The following rows display the tem-
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poral pattern of activity corresponding to the different premotor schemas: LU, HE, DM, LM, GG,
HO respectively. Notice no activity in the third row (HG REC) after the HG lesion (B) which
causes the DM and LM activity to be simultaneous, hence, causing the mouth not to open and the
tongue not to be active (last two rows).
Figure 9. Information flow for learning to snap. This diagram provides a schematic representation
of the schema activation flow and how information patterns flow in the schema network. Notice the
same topological configuration as that of figure 5. The adaptation to reduce the prediction error
(jaw rec(t+ 1)− ˆjaw rec(t+ 1)) and the performance error (jaw rec∗(t+ 1)− jaw rec(t+ 1)) are
displayed outside the signal flow to avoid cluttering the image for clarity reasons.
Figure 10. The first row displays the goal pattern of activity jaw rec∗(t + 1), i.e. the sub-
goal state produced by the goal schema GPREY,JAW REC (due to the prey(t) activity pattern).
The second row displays the modulatory activity pattern in oLM,JAW REC(t) produced by the ac-
tivation of the dual schema SLM,JAW REC . In summary these activity patterns are produced by
the goal and dual schemas chain: prey(t)→ jaw rec∗(t+ 1)→ oLM,JAW REC(t).
Figure 11. A. Reconstruction of the ”optimal” lm′(t) activity pattern due to the projection
of the correcting modulatory pattern of activity from the constructed dual schema SLM,JAW REC .
The first row displays the original pattern of activity lm(t), the second row displays the opti-
mal modulatory activity pattern oLM,JAW REC(t), and the third row displays, for clarity reasons,
the difference between the original pattern and the one produced by the dual schema, namely,
oLM,JAW REC(t)− lm(t).
Figure 12. Representation of the cause-effect relations in the simplified example consisting of
five schemas, three of which are motor schemas A, B, C and two of which are perceptual schemas
1, 2. The black squares represent the existence of a cause-effect relation between the respective
motor and perceptual schemas with that specific delay τi. On the other hand, the white squares
represent the lack of any cause-effect relation between the respective motor and perceptual schemas.
Figure 13. Cause-effect parameters r after learning during the different prey-catching motor
programs. A. After Tongue Prehension (TP). B. After Jaw Prehension (JP). C. After both TP and
JP. Different columns indicate the plausible causes for the corresponding effects (sensory feedbacks)
by indicating the weight (by the size of the square -black positive and white negative). Columns
are grouped by type of sensory feedback in five groups of six. The five different groups are sepa-
rated by a complete line of white blocks. For instance the first six columns represent the relation
between HG REC and LU, HE, DM, LM, GG, HO respectively. The second six columns represent
the relation between JAW REC and LU, HE, DM, LM, GG, HO respectively. The other groups
of columns correspond to TONGUE REC, DISTX and DISTY respectively. Rows, on the other
hand, correspond to different delays starting with 0 msec and with consecutive increments of 10
msec. Notice that HG-REC did not ”correlate” well with any of the ”potential” causes. This ac-
tually reflects the fact that HG-REC is independent (spontaneous activity linked with respiratory
processes) and has no relation with any other schema (relations represented as full white squares).
Notice the initial accidental pairing (LU, JAW-REC) during the Jaw Prehension (B) is resolved by
the uncoupling during Tongue Prehension since during TP LU is very small or inexistant whereas
JAW-REC is very active. In the same way the initial accidental pairing (GG, JAW-REC) during
TP (A) is resolved by the uncoupling during Jaw Prehension. So that after both TP and JP (C) the
remaining cause- effect relations are: (DM, JAW REC), (LM, JAW-REC), (GG, TONGUE REC),
42
(HO, TONGUE REC), (LU, DISTX), (LU, DISTY), and (HE, DISTY).
Figure 14. Overall process of schema(s) construction for learning to detour. Construction of
the new predictive schema PMHM,SIDE and its dual schema SSIDE,MHM , as well as transforma-
tion of the schema SSIDE to receive a new modulatory input. (A) Already existing schemas that
determine the cause and effect schemas. (B) Goal schemas previously learned. (C) New predictive
and dual schemas and its new topological configuration with respect to the pre-existing schemas.
Dashed lines indicate the new connections formed during the constructive process. SMHM input
to the dual schema SSIDE,MHM is replicated aside not to clutter the image with lines.
Figure 15. Generalized process of schema(s) construction. Construction of the new predictive
schema P x,y and its dual schema Sy,x. In turn, cause schema Sy is adapted to instantiate a mod-
ulatory input port from the dual schema (represented by dashed lines). This in turn adapts its
behavioral specification as now it has to take into account this instantiated modulatory signal.
Figure 16. Overall process of schema(s) construction for learning to snap. Notice that this
figure has the same topological configuration as that of Figure 15 but instantiated by Sy = SLM
and Sx = SJAW REC .
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